Foreign
policy from the American perspective, in the era of Trump, requires the merging
of two often incongruous points: what we see and what we know. It begs the
question, how reliable are our eyes and
ears?
Yesterday
we saw a form of détente being exercised between North and South Korea. Today
we will hear about a significant role the US (and more specifically D. Trump)
played in putting together what is being billed as the end of the 70 year old
Korean War. Such an accomplishment, with additional overtones of reducing
future armed conflict on the Korean peninsula is of a level that starts Nobel
Peace Prize speculation.
We
also saw Mike Pompeo pictured with Kim Jong-un last month. What was going on
there? It all looks so…well, progressive. This is made especially true
following the reintroduction into the American fear machine of nuclear holocaust,
made particularly vivid by videos of Hawaiian citizens running amuck in
paradise.
Okay
then…so what do we know?
We
know that North Korea has survived for three generations as a fully
authoritarian regime. Kim is viewed by the majority of North Koreans
essentially as a deity, as was his father and grandfather. We know that even with a compromised economy
it has been able to successfully develop both nuclear weapons and delivery
systems.
We
know that since the end of military conflict in the early 1950s the US has been
the target of national hostility, loathing, and a useful tool for North Korean national
unity. America is to Kim what the Jews were to Hitler.
We
know that Kim is 35 years old (or 34 or 36 depending on the source) and it is
reasonable to believe that he has every intention of keeping his job until
death, as has been the family tradition. He could easily have 50 years left to his
term, so whatever game he may be playing you can assume it’s the long game.
We
also know he is ruthless, given the public assassinations and known political
gulags. Benevolence is not in his wheelhouse. Just ask the Warmbier family. It is meaningless that he likes
to listen to electropop or watch basketball.
We
know that the Trump administration has demonstrated a type of political
pragmatism that more resembles pinball ambiguity than pinpoint precision. The haphazard turnover in Administration
leadership is nowhere more evident than in the State Department with the
Tillerson efforts to completely dismantle it like an unprofitable corporate acquisition.
We
know that child-like rhetoric has been Trump’s response to North Korea’s
nuclear and ballistic successes. We also know that Trump is playing a short
game (a fact that’s essentially true for most in American politics), and given
his erratic behavior toward the legal woes he faces, it’s likely his preference
is a very short game.
So
if what we see doesn’t mesh with what we know, where does that take us?
Here
should be the givens: Kim Jong-un is not going to denuclearize his regime. It
is a carrot that will never get within a yard of the donkey’s nose. It makes
absolutely no sense for an authoritarian government to give up the only ace in
its hand.
What
Kim wants is the US out of South Korea, expand his relationship with China,
Russia, and, probably, Vietnam to keep the US out of the Yellow Sea and much of
the Sea of Japan. He wants reduced influence by the US over South Korea and he
can wait years, maybe decades to make it happen.
By normalizing relations (trade, exchange
etc.) with South Korea and dangling unification along with denuclearization he is
hoping to get South Korea to be the landlord to evict the Americans. Trump, with his game limited to a couple of
years at best (maybe far less…go Mueller),
will jump on any bandwagon which he thinks will make him a candidate for Nobel
status.
As
incongruous as it might appear, it may end up being the right course of action.
The
only weapon I believe to be useful in undermining Kim Jong-un’s iron hold over
the North Korean people (& policy) is prosperity. Perhaps in post-Trump America we can figure a
way to be a leading force in advancing North Korea’s economy instead of the
continual militarily adversarial position we have taken for 70 years.
It
is obvious Korean unification will never happen until the two Koreas look
essentially alike. Let’s work toward making them both look like South Korea.